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*** 
We combine cyber risk literature with insurance law and economics literature to study cyber 
insurance contracts. We aim to explore to what extent current cyber insurance contracts 
contribute to social welfare, both theoretically and empirically. First, we discuss main trade-
offs in insuring cyber risk within a theoretical framework. This framework also includes 
account strategic behavior of market participants and impediments for market growth that 
result from the complex dynamics of cyber risk. Subsequently, a case study in the 
Netherlands compares the theoretical expectations with the actual state of cyber insurance 
contracts, prices and market participants. The results suggest that insurers currently halt 
between two options: either a strategy of rigorous market penetration with easily accessible 
and attractive insurance products, or a strategy of significant hedging of correlated risks that 
reduces the potential of cyber insurance. We aim to assist lawyers, legal councils and judges 
when drafting or reviewing actual cyber insurance contracts.  
 




In this contribution, we combine cyber risk literature with insurance law and economics 
literature to study cyber insurance contracts. It aims to explore to what extent current cyber 
insurance contracts for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) contribute to social welfare, 
and what options exist to improve these contracts to utilize the potential of cyber insurance. 
Therefore, we first discus the potential of insuring cyber risk to reduce market failures in 
cyber security. Hereafter, a theoretical framework for cyber insurance contracts, prices, and 
strategies of market participants is formulated. Within this framework, we discuss trade-offs 
to be made in order to attain a cyber insurance market that can contribute to social welfare. 
Simultaneously, it evaluates impediments to socially ideal situations including strategic 
behavior of the insured and the systemic instability of cyber risks, leading to expectations on 
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the insurers' strategies regarding the design of insurance contracts. In order to compare the 
expectations from the theoretical framework with the actual state of cyber insurance 
contracts, we empirically analyze the emerging field of cyber insurance for SMEs by 
reviewing actual cyber insurance contracts through a case study in the Netherlands. Insurance 
contracts were requested from all insurers offering cyber insurance on the Dutch market. Six 
different SMEs, varying in size and Internet dependency, are included. This setup allows for 
an analysis and comparison of insurance contracts of different insurers for alternative types of 
SMEs, and to analyze prices and the number of market participants. Hence, the Dutch case 
study provides a way to observe how insurance companies design contracts and respond to 
challenges of the insurability of cyber risks, which include the correlated nature of cyber risks 
and the lack of actuarial data in this particular field.  
 The Authors performed this study because research on the law and economics of 
cyber insurance contracts is scarce, but important. The limited empirical research on the 
content of cyber insurance contracts that is available in practice concerns case studies in the 
United States more than a decade ago.1 Obviously, the information and communication 
technology landscape has changed considerably in the past decade. Drivers for the evolution 
of the cyber landscape include the development of smartphones, Big Data, Internet of Things 
and the availability of more easy to use cybercrime tools. Hence, hypotheses and results from 
the early 2000s that concern the state and development of cyber insurance deserve an update. 
Besides studying the development of the cyber insurance market as such, insurance law 
theory can be developed further by learning from the new structure and dynamics of the 
cyber risk market. In this way, we aim to contribute to the overarching literature on the 
insurability of risks and to add a possible important cornerstone to the current literature on 
cyber insurance. Studies from this field focus mainly on the insurability and description of 
cyber risk but do not take into account the actual analysis of the policies and premiums 
itself.2 Hence, from an academic perspective, this research contributes to literature on cyber 
                                                
1 Perry Luzwick, If Most of Your Revenue is From E-commerce, Then Cyber-Insurance Makes Sense, 2001 
Computer Fraud and Security 3, 16-17  (1999); Robert H. Jerry II & Michele L. Mekel, Cybercoverage for 
Cyber-Risks: An Overview of Insurers' Responses to the Perils of E-Commerce, Conn. Ins. L.J.  8, 7-36 
(2001); Jay P. Kesan, Majuca P. Ruperto & William J. Yurcik, The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance, 
Working paper, University of Illinois, IL. (2004). There are more recently published updates about the 
state of the cyber insurance market, but they do not explain the methodology followed, and cannot be 
qualified as scientific research, see for instance: Rob Van de Laar, Cyberrisico’s: Meer dan ICT, AMPlus 
10, 49-52 (2013). 
2 Rainer Böhme & Galina Schwartz, Modelling cyber-insurance: Towards A Unifying Framework, Paper 
presented at 2010 9th Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Harvard Business 
School, Boston, MA. (2010); Philip Rawlings, Cyber Risk: Insuring the Digital Age, Queen Mary School 
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insurance law as well as to literature regarding insurability for cyber-risks. From a law 
practice perspective, this research can inform courts which want to take economically sound 
decisions with regard to cyber insurance law. It is crucial for lawyers and insurance contract 
drafters to be aware of the economic effects of insurance law, because judges may scrutinize 
cyber insurance contracts from a law and economics perspective. Lawyers, general councils 
and judges can be aided by a structured summary of industry wide cyber insurance contracts. 
We therefore give a legal overview of insurance contracts, discuss directions for a socially 
ideal set up of those contracts, discuss strategic behavior by insurance companies and observe 
to what extent those contracts are enhancing social welfare.  
 Based on our case study, we find that insurers use different approaches to respond to 
the specific challenges of cyber security. On the one hand, some of the behavior of insurers is 
aimed at gaining market share and eventually market size. A bigger market results in more 
data about cyber security risks. This is attractive for consumers and this enhances social 
welfare. On the other hand, some elements within contracts are primarily aimed at reducing 
(private) risk for the insurer, thereby lowering the likelihood that a market will develop. 
Thus, insurance companies seem to be halting between two options, gaining market share 
while on the other hand reducing and managing their own risk. This currently hinders the 
cyber insurance market from reaching its full potential in contributing to social welfare. A 
possible explanation for these findings is that traditional insurers, which might not have 
adequate experience to insure cyber risks, offer the cyber risks insurance. Cyber risks are a 
completely different category of risks and have a different lifecycle than other risks that those 
companies traditionally insure. A last important finding is that insurers in general use very 
little ‘moral hazard measures’.3 These are requirements the insurer gives to the insured in 
order to decrease the likelihood of claims. This has unused potential, since moral hazard 
measures are considered welfare enhancing.4 
                                                                                                                                                  
of Law Legal, research paper 189 (2015); ENISA, Incentives and Barriers of the Cyber Insurance Market 
in Europe, Report for the European Commission  (2012); Christian Biener, Martin Eling & Jan H. Wirfs, 
Insurability of Cyber Risk: An Empirical Analysis, 40 The Geneva Papers 1, 131-158 (2014); Mark 
Greisiger, Cyber Liability & Data Breach Insurance Claims - A Study of Actual Payouts for Covered Data 
Breaches, Gladwayne, PA: NetDilligence (2011). 
3 An example of a moral hazard measure that the Authors did observe is the requirement to make a back up 
every week.  
4 That is, when the social marginal benefits of these moral hazard measures are larger than the social marginal 
costs. Because the insurer potentially has more information about the market than the insured, he is in a better 
position to judge which investments are efficient.  
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 The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. In section II we briefly 
describe cyber risk and various market failures that frustrate a socially efficient allocation of 
cyber security investments. In the general literature (not specifically aimed at cyber risk), 
various potential remedies for these market failures are proposed, insurance being one of 
them. We subsequently discuss the potential of cyber insurance to contribute to social 
welfare. In section III, we investigate hurdles that need to be overcome in cyber insurance 
contracts, prices, and competition, in order for cyber insurance to contribute to social welfare. 
This section analyzes coverage clauses, prices, competitors, adverse selection, reverse 
adverse selection and moral hazard measures. For each element, trade-offs and impediments 
for attaining a socially ideal situation are discussed. Moreover, this section formulates 
expectations on the design of cyber insurance contracts for Dutch SMEs, given the 
impediments for growth. Section IV describes the setup for the case study. We collected 
information on actual cyber insurance policies from nine insurers operating on the Dutch 
market, for six different potential insured SMEs with varying characteristics. Section V 
presents the results of the case study. This section analyzes how the offered policies compare 
to the expectations from the theoretical framework. Subsequently, contracts are discussed on 
various aspects including premiums, deductibles, caps, coverage, moral hazard- and adverse 
selection clauses, and requesting procedures. Section VI draws conclusions from the 
empirical analysis and provides ideas about how cyber insurance policies may be improved, 
and give suggestions for future research.  
 
II. CYBER RISK AND THE POTENTIAL OF INSURING IT 
A. Cyber Risk 
The digital economy is a driver for economic growth. For instance, the usage of information 
technology has added 21% to the GDP growth of developed countries between 2006 and 
2011.5 Organizations increasingly use, and depend on, information technology products. This 
increased dependence on information technology has created a new hazard: cyber risk. We 
define cyber risk as the potential physical harm (to persons or property) and loss of profits 
due to malfunction of digital systems or corrupted data. The potential impact on society is 
large because information systems are interdependent. This can cause cascade effects, 
                                                
5 Matthieu Pélissié du Rausas, Internet Matters: The Net’s Sweeping Impact on Growth, Jobs and Prosperity, 
McKinsey&Company (2011), 




meaning that an incident can quickly spread among the users of the information system. 
Cyber risk hence is a systemic risk. For example, an error in a cloud computing service could 
quickly spread among all users, with potential catastrophic consequences.6  
Cyber risk can be decomposed to threat, vulnerability and impact .7  
• Threat concerns the probability that the potentially damaging event happens. This Article 
considers three types of threats: cybercrime, human errors and system failures.  
• Vulnerability concerns the likelihood that once a threat materializes, losses occur. In so-
called resilient systems, threats can take place without causing loss. Automatic back-ups 
and proper firewalls for example can avoid losses due to threats such as accidental 
deletion of files resp. virus attacks.  
• Impact regards the losses due to the incident. Two important distinctions are made: 
o First party damage is damage at the organization that owns the information 
technology system.8 Third party damage is damage at other organizations affected by 
the manifestation of cyber risk. In a situation of interdependent information systems 
of multiple third parties, the value of the assets of third parties probably exceeds the 
value of the first party. Third party damage then outweighs first party damage. This is 
especially relevant for SMEs, which have relatively limited assets but may cause 
substantial third party damage. 
o First order damage equals the direct costs organizations incur when a cyber incident 
occurs. A few examples: organizations can lose personal or company data through 
hacking, or failing hardware and software or mistakes of employees can interrupt their 
business.9 Second order damage is the negative effect of an incident once it becomes 
public,10 for example reputation damage.11 Another example is being fined for not 
                                                
6 Andreas Haas & Annette Hofmann, Risiken aus Cloud-Computing-Services: Fragen des Risikomanagements 
und Aspekte der Versicherbarkeit,  FZID Discussion Paper No.74, Hohenheim (2013). 
7 ISO, Information Technology - Security Techniques - Information Security Risk Management, ISO/IEC 27005 
(2011), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:56742:en (accessed 21 March 2016); Yacov Y. Haimes, On 
the Definition of Vulnerabilities in Measuring Risks to Infrastructures, 26 Risk Analysis 2, 293-296 
(2006); Eric J. Byres & Justin Lowe, The Myths and Facts Behind Cyber Security Risks for Industrial 
Control Systems, Paper presented at 2004 VDE Congress, Berlin (2004). 
8 Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, eds., Research Handbook on the Economics of Insurance Law, 
Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing (2015). 
9 James J. Cebula & Lisa R. Young, A Taxonomy of Operational Cyber Security Risks, Software Engineering 
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (2010), http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/10tn028.pdf (accessed 21 
March 2016). 
10 Tridib Bandyopadhyay, Vijay S. Mookerjee & Ram C. Rao, A Model to Analyze the Unfulfilled Promise of 
Cyber Insurance: The Impact of Secondary Loss, Working paper, University of Texas, TX  (2004). 
11 Jennifer. R. Veltsos, An Analysis of Data Breach Notifications as Negative News, 75 Business 
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notifying breaches to a data breach notification authority.  Second order damage is 
more difficult to measure than first order damage and hence harder to transfer to a 
third party such as an insurer. This could result in suboptimal claim behavior in the 
case of cyber insurance.12 
 
B. Market Failures in Cyber Risk 
Parties can take care measures to reduce (the costs of) cyber risk. Law and economics 
literature labels care as ‘socially optimal’ if the additional social (‘marginal’) costs of taking 
more care equal marginal benefits thereof.13 The socially optimal level of cyber risk hence 
will be reached if socially optimal care is taken. Care measures can be targeted at all three 
elements of cyber risk: threat, vulnerability and impact. Some threats tend to be relatively 
immune for care measures, such as malware attacks that seem to occur independent of one's 
care level,14 while the likelihood of materialization of other threats such as human failures 
can be reduced by taking actions such as cyber security awareness training courses. 
Vulnerability can be reduced by, among others, regularly updating firewalls, virus scanners 
and operating systems.15 Impact can be reduced by for instance segmentation of valuable 
assets,16 or by mitigation measures after the incident,17 such as notification of the breach to 
other potentially affected parties.18 
Within cyber security, the social costs and benefits differ from the private cost and 
benefits so that the market will not reach the social optimum by itself.19 Positive externalities 
exist when third parties benefit from the investments of another party. This results in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Communication Quarterly 2, 192-207 (2012). 
12 Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 10.  
13 See the following publications for an extensive discussion on this topic: Steven Shavell, Foundations of 
Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2004); Robert 
Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, Boston, MA: Pearson Addison Wesley (2004); Hans-Bernd 
Schafer & Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing  
(2005); Michael G. Faure, Tort Law and Economics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing (2009). 
14 Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Hadi Asghari, Carlos Gañán & Michel van Eeten, Why them? Extracting 
Intelligence About Target Selection from Banking Trojans, Paper presented at 2014 13th Annual 
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Pennsylvania (2014). 
15 CERT-UK & GCHQ, Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing the Impact. UK: Crown (2015). 
16 Pramod Pandya, Local Area Network Security, in J. R. Vacca, ed., Network and System Security, second 
edition, Waltham, MA: Syngress (2014). 
17 Faure, supra note 13. 
18 Bernold F. H. Nieuwesteeg, The Legal Position and Societal Effects of Security Breach Notification Laws, 
Amsterdam: Delex (2014). 
19 Ruperto P. Majuca, William Yurcik & Jay P. Kesan, The Evolution of Cyberinsurance, Arxiv (2006), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0601020 (accessed 21 March 2016). 
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underinvestment, because private benefits are smaller than social benefits. 20  When an 
increase in care level of a single organizations negatively affect cyber security of third 
parties, negative externalities exist. In this situation, their care level is higher than socially 
optimal and they will overinvest. 21  Moreover, information asymmetries exist for 
organizations purchasing products to reduce cyber risk, because it is difficult for them to 
assess the quality of Internet security products.22 This also leads to underinvestment in care 
measures, because one is not willing to pay for something of which one cannot verify the 
quality. 23  Hence, the well-known market failures of positive externalities, negative 
externalities and information asymmetry avoid the market from reaching the desirable 
situation. 
In the literature, several solutions have been proposed to correct suboptimal care levels 
caused by externalities and information asymmetries in general. For instance, liability for 
cyber risks can internalize externalities.24 Also regulation can affect care levels, for example 
data breach notification laws which mandate disclosure of data breaches, thereby increasing 
information about cyber insecurity in the market.25 Another solution, the central theme in this 
contribution, is insurance of cyber risks.26 In as far as insurers have better information about 
risks than the insured and can induce the insured to take desirable care measures via the 
insurance contract, insurance can tackle the market failures discussed above. Moreover, the 
transfer of risks to an insurer results in a reduction of risk, which creates additional social 
benefits. Section II.C below discusses the benefits of insuring cyber risks more thoroughly. A 
last solution worth mentioning could be inducing organizations to pool their risks,27 for 
                                                
20 Ross Anderson, Why Information Security is Hard -- An Economic Perspective,  Presented at 2001 ACSAC, 
New Orleans, LA (2001), http://www.acsac.org/2001/papers/110.pdf (accessed 21 March 2016). 
21 Compare for instance the two identical bicycles standing next to each other, one with a outstanding lock and 
another with a mediocre lock. Suppose a thief has the ability to crack every lock. A thief is likely to steal the 
bicycle with the smallest lock. Hence, the level of care of the bicycle owner with the outstanding lock has 
negative externalities for the bicycle owner with the mediocre lock.  
22 Tyler Moore, The Economics of Cybersecurity: Principles and Policy Options, 3 International J. of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection 3-4, 103-117 (2010).  
23 Anderson, supra note 20. 
24 Faure, supra note 13. 
25 Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang & Allesandro Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity 
Theft?, 30 J. of Policy Analysis and Management 2, 256-286 (2011). 
26 For insurance in general, see Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-
Protection, 80 J. of Political Economy 4, 623-648 (1972). For cyber insurance, see Annette Hofmann & 
Hidajet Ramaj, Interdependent Risk Networks: The Threat of Cyber Attack, 11 Int. J. of Management and 
Decision Making 5/6, 312-323 (2011). See also ENISA, and Biener et al., supra note 2. 
27 Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, Insurance and Expanding Systemic Risks, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, online publication 28 June 2003,  doi:10.1787/9789264102910-en. 
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instance through providing financial instruments for risk sharing.28 Pooling of cyber risks is 
especially fruitful when risk bearers have more information about the market than insurers, 
and therefore plays a possible important role in future research towards risk ownership 
structures in cyber security, as section VI will discuss recommendations.29 
 
C. The Potential of Insuring Cyber Risk 
As said, this contribution does not aim to thoroughly discuss and compare the various 
alternatives mentioned above. It focuses on the insurance of cyber risks. The core raison 
d’être of insurance lies in the fact that individuals, and to a lesser extent organizations, are 
risk averse.30 Risk averse actors experience a decreasing marginal utility of wealth. This 
implies that for an identical expected loss, they prefer a larger probability of a smaller loss 
over a smaller probability of a larger loss. They are even willing to pay more than the 
expected loss to reduce or remove the uncertainty.31 The degree of risk aversion is affected 
by the size of the loss as compared to the size of the assets, and by possibilities of risk 
diversification. As SMEs are relatively small and have limited ability to effectively diversify, 
they can be assumed to be risk averse. Hence, firms can use cyber insurance to transfer cyber 
risks (which are low probability, high impact risks) to the insurer.32 In as far as firms are 
more risk averse than insurers, this increases social welfare.33 Moreover, an additional 
economic surplus is created when risk is being transferred from the insured to an insurer. The 
latter has the ability to pool them together with risks of other clients, which due to the ‘law of 
                                                
28 Goran Skogh, Risk-sharing Institutions for Unpredictable Losses, 155 J. of Theoretical and Institutional 
Economics 3, 505-515 (1999); Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, Information Security Economics - and 
Beyond, Presented at the 2008 9th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, 
Luxembourg (2008), https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/econ_crypto.pdf (accessed 21 March 2016). 
29 Faure & Hartlief, supra note 27. 
30 McKinsey & Company, McKinsey on Finance (2012), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/corporate_finance/latest_thinking/~/media/D2CF206B82C34F1
FBB87FE591599A958.ashx (accessed 21 March 2016).  
31 See p.377 in Gerhard Wagner,  Tort Law and Liability Insurance, in Michael G. Faure, Ed., Tort Law and 
Economics, Volume I Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, second edition, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
(2009); see p.59 in Peter Zweifel &  Roland Eisen, Versicherungsökonomie, Berlin: Springer Verlag 
(2003); see p.258 in Shavell, supra note 13. 
32 Arunhaba Mukhopadhyay, Samir Chatterjee, Debashis Saha, Ambuj Mahanti & Samir K. Sadhukhan, Cyber-
Risk Decision Models: To Insure IT or not?, 56 Decision Support Systems 1, 11-26 (2013); Scott J. 
Shackelford, Should Your Firm Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?,  55 Business Horizons 4, 349-356 
(2012). 
33 Kesan, Majuca & Yurcik, supra note 1. 
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the large numbers’ reduces risk for the insurer and enables more accurate predictions of the 
expected losses.34  
Besides the welfare increasing transfer of risk, insurance also stimulates insurers to 
reduce risk by incentivizing desirable behavior of the insured.  In as far as insurance 
companies, being repeat players,35 have better information about risks and the possibilities to 
reduce them than their clients, being one-shotters, welfare increases further. By insuring a 
large number of similar risks, insurers obtain information about these risks, for example the 
accident probability, the size of the losses, the possible care measures et cetera.36 This can be 
done by requiring the insured to take specific care measures, such as installing sprinklers in 
the field of property insurance, or ensuring up-to-date operating systems and regular security 
backups in the field of cyber insurance. This increase in the level of care increases social 
welfare if the costs of investments are lower than their societal benefits. Insurers are more in 
the position of taking into account social effects because an insurance pool (at least partly) 
will internalize externalities associated with cyber security. Another way cyber insurers could 
increase IT safety,37 is to tie premiums to the insured firm’s care level. This creates market-
based incentives for organizations to increase their level of IT safety. This kind of expert 
knowledge of the insurer is also the reason why firms, even if they would not be risk averse, 
may prefer market insurance over self-insurance.38  
 From the perspective of the insurance company, there are various reasons why 
offering cyber insurance would be profitable. The demand side of the cyber insurance market 
mainly consists of firms with a significant amount of IT in their core business process.39 As a 
result, insurers have a large number of similar risks available for pooling. Furthermore, cyber 
insurance differs from more general insurance products and this gives rise to new possibilities 
for insurers to enlarge their client base, diversify their risk portfolio and to obtain higher 
profits. 
 
III. CYBER INSURANCE CONTRACTS, PRICES & COMPETITION 
                                                
34 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. , 1521-1590 (1987). 
35 Marc Galanter,  Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 1974 L. 
and Society 9, 95-160 (1974). 
36 Goran Skogh, Insurance and the Institutional Economics of Financial Intermediation, The Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance 16, 360-370 (1991). 
37 Kesan et al., supra note 1. 
38 Wagner, supra note 31, p. 379. 
39 Tridib Bandyopadhyay, Vijay S. Mookerjee & Ram C. Rao, Why IT Managers Don’t Go for Cyber-Insurance 
Products, 52 Communication of the ACM 11, 68-73  (2009).  
9 
 
The past section discussed the potential of insuring cyber risk in order to reduce market 
failures in cyber security. Unfortunately, there are barriers to the utilization of this potential. 
Both insurance law and economics literature as well as cyber risk literature distinguishes 
several elements that hinder the insurability of risks.40 Specific for cyber insurance law (and 
more broadly for systemic risks) is the fact that insurance contracts have to deal with 
correlated risks. Also, there are problems of information asymmetry and information 
unavailability in the context of cyber insurance markets. According to the economic analysis 
of law, one of the main roles of insurance law is to protect the parties from strategically 
exploiting hidden information. An information surplus at the side of the insured results in 
adverse selection (ex ante, before signing the contract) and moral hazard (ex post, after 
signing the contract).41 An information surplus at the side of the insurer may result in 
strategic behavior of the insurer, such as reverse adverse selection.42  
 The current section investigates the hurdles that need to be overcome in cyber 
insurance contracts, prices and competition in order for cyber insurance to really contribute to 
social welfare. This section analyzes coverage clauses (section III.A), prices and competitors 
(B) and adverse selection-, reverse adverse selection and moral hazard measures in 
subsections C, D, and E respectively. Each subsection considers (i) the socially ideal situation 
(or main trade-offs that have to be made) and the lessons to be learned from existing 
insurance literature on cyber risks and systemic risks; (ii) the impediments for growth, how 
they relate to strategic behavior of the insurer and which contractual solutions insurance 
companies can use to reach their private optimum and thus diverge from the social optimum; 
and (iii) the expectations regarding the design of cyber insurance contracts for Dutch SMEs, 
given these impediments. 
 
                                                
40See p. 13 in Baruch Berliner, Die Grenzen der Versicherbarkeit von Risiken, Zürich: Schweizerische 
Rückversicherungsgesellschaft (1982); Faure & Hartlief, supra note 27; Gerhard Wagner, (Un)insurability 
and the Choice between Market Insurance and Public Compensation Systems, in W.H. van Boom and 
Michael G. Faure, eds., Shifts in Compensation Between Private and Public Systems, Vienna: Springer 
Verlag, 87-112 (2007); Wagner, supra note 31. 
41 See among many others, Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 
American Economic Rev., 941-973 (1963); George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, 84 Quarterly J. of 
Economics, 488 (1970); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Quarterly J. of Economics, 
541-562 (1979); Shavell, supra note 13. 
42 Ex post an information surplus at the insured side can also result in reverse moral hazard, but since this is not 
observable in the contract itself, this Article will exclude reverse moral hazard from the discussion.  
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A. Correlated Risks and Coverage 
This subsection develops a theoretical framework on coverage for cyber risks under the 
condition that cyber risks are (at least partly) correlated. Hence this subsection will first 
discuss the correlated nature of cyber security risks and subsequently the theoretical 
expectations regarding the impact of correlated risks on coverage clauses.  
 Risks in an insurance pool need to have some degree of independence from each 
other. Dependent risks, also called correlated risks, have a lower degree of insurability. With 
correlated risks, the risk of the risk pool does not equal average risk: the law of the large 
numbers does not work. After all, if a large fraction of all the risks would materialize 
together, the insurer would not be able to provide coverage for all these simultaneous losses. 
Thus, correlated risks make the insurance pool inherently instable. Closely connected to the 
fact that risks should be independent of each other is the fact that an insurable risk should be 
non-catastrophic, meaning that a single incident should not be so large that it would bankrupt 
the insurer. Incidents can have a large upside that exceeds the financial reserves of insurers. 
Capacity problems are especially present when third party damage and secondary damage are 
covered.43 A clear example of a catastrophic incident is a nuclear incident.44  
 So-called ‘systemic risks’ are characterized by the fact that they are not (fully) 
independent and hence have some degree of correlation. Sometimes they can be even 
catastrophic. New systemic risks, which result from recent technological advancement, are a 
specific subset of those risks.45 Scholars and practitioners regard cyber risk as a new systemic 
risk.46 For instance, the CEO of Catlin, Stephen Catlin, warned in February 2015 that cyber 
risks present the ‘biggest, most systemic risk’ he has encountered in an insurance career of 
more than 40 years.47 The systemic element is caused by the high degree of interdependence 
of information systems. Existing information technology is designed in a similar way and 
consequently vulnerable to the same incidents, hence incidents are potentially highly 
                                                
43 See for third party damage Howarth Kunreuther, Robin M. Hogarth &Jacqueline Meszaros, Insurer ambiguity 
and market failure, 7 J. of Risk and Uncertainty 1, 71-87 (1993); see for second party damage Bandyopadhyay, 
Mookerjee & Rao, supra note 10. 
44 Willem. H. van Boom, Insurance Law and Economics: An Empirical Perspective, in Michael G. Faure & 
Frank Stephen, eds., Essays in the law and economics of regulation - in honour of Anthony Ogus. 
Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 253-276 (2008). 
45 Faure & Hartlief, supra note 27. 
46 Gwen Ackerman, G-20 Urged to Treat Cyber-Attacks as Threat to Economy (2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/Articles/2013-06-13/g-20-urged-to-treat-cyber-attacks-as-threat-to-
economy (accessed 21 March 2016); World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2014, Report for the World 
Economic Forum (2014). 
47 Gatlin is the owner of the largest syndicate at Lloyd’s (Financial Times 5 February 2015).  
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correlated between firms.48 When risks are correlated, the expected value of the insurer's pool 
of risks does not converge to its average; if the risk materializes, many other risks will 
materialize as well through cascade effects. In theory, there are cyber cases imaginable of 
perfect correlation, i.e. where all incidents happen at the same point in time: a zero day 
exploit in a widely used operating system,  a large-scale malware attack, or a vulnerability in 
a widely used operating system. Such cyber incidents can be catastrophic and insurers might 
not be capable of reimbursing the damage. Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence 
about the degree in which cyber risks are correlated. For instance, within 25 years of internet 
communication, no catastrophic cyber incident, comparable with for instance a big 
earthquake or the meltdown of a nuclear power plant, has happened so far. 
 It is difficult to observe which cyber risks affect the continuity and solvency of an 
insurer. Still, general categorizations can be made, for instance, the distinction between 
correlated risks and cascade effects. Correlated risks in an insurance portfolio are risks that 
simultaneously affect several insured parties. Cascade effects occur when the 
operationalization of one risk as such causes a domino effect at other third parties. A matrix 
of these types of risks is displayed in Table 1. 
 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
 
In case there are neither cascade effects, nor correlated risks, the risk is in theory 
independent, and hence perfectly insurable. There are for instance types of coverage that will 
only operationalize when first party risks are not correlated. An example is reputation 
damage or, to a lesser extent, the coverage for fines. When only one company is hit by a 
cyber incident, it is likely that there is potentially significant reputation damage. But when a 
cyber incident hits many, the reputation damage for each individual company is likely to be 
small. When a risk does have cascade effects, but is not a correlated risk (one could think of a 
targeted attack that unleashes third party personal data), third party coverage determines the 
eventual systemic risk for the insurer. However, caps on claims for these kinds of third party 
risk are a simple option to mitigate uncorrelated third party risks. With regard to risks that are 
indeed correlated, the systemic element increases significantly. In that case, as discussed 
before, risk, for example an exploit that allows for the installment of ransomware, can 
operationalize simultaneously among several insured in the pool. In that case, the law of the 
                                                
48 Walter. S. Baer & Andrew Parkinson, Cyberinsurance in IT Security Management, IEEE Security and 
Privacy May/June (2007), doi:10.1109/MSP.2007.57 (accessed 21 March 2016). 
12 
 
large numbers is not applicable anymore. Potential cascade effects increase the impact of 
correlated risks even further. Thus: “correlated risks are not so much an impediment to 
efficiency but a category of risks that are generally hard to insure”.49 
 What are the implications of the systemic element of cyber risks for the optimal 
design of cyber insurance coverage from a social welfare perspective? The question is 
whether the category of cyber risks that SMEs want to insure overlaps with the category of 
cyber risks that insurers are willing to insure, given the aforementioned systemic 
uncertainties. Arguably, social welfare could be increased when SMEs can transfer cyber 
risks they cannot bear (i.e. low probability - high impact risks) to an insurer that can bear 
them and is willing to bear them. This also implies that, from a rational actor perspective, 
SMEs do not insure cyber risks that they can bear (low impact risks). Although the 
perception of ‘high impact’ might vary across the size, organizational type and risk appetite 
of SMEs, in general it would be desirable for them to have relatively high deductibles and 
high caps. However, insurers should manage the risk of large-scale cyber incidents and may 
therefore demand lower caps to reduce the risk of a 'catastrophic upside' due to cascade 
effects. These two conflicting interests should be traded off to reach a final outcome.50 
 The exact types of coverage to be included are closely related to the insurance 
premium and the cap. On the one hand, more limited coverage leads to lower premiums but 
also implies that the insured will not receive compensation for costs resulting from excluded 
events. For SMEs, it depends on the type of company which costs are most urgent to cover. 
For companies with many third party personal data, for instance, potential costs related to 
third party damage could be the highest and therefore most urgent to cover, especially due to 
possible cascade effects of a cyber incident. These costs include claims, fines, legal expenses, 
and crisis control expenses in case of lost of client and/or company information. On the other 
hand, for the insured, insured risks that have a high likelihood of being correlated might be 
difficult to insure because of their negative impact on the distribution of the insurance pool.  
 Would it be desirable that insurance companies offer the same coverage? A clear 
advantage is the comparability of policies across insurers, facilitating transparent decision 
making for firms looking for insurance. Besides, loss data can be aggregated 
straightforwardly which might help to solve the broader problem of information 
unavailability, which will be discussed in section III.B. On the other hand, fixed contracts do 
                                                
49 Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law - A Primer,  19 Conn. Ins. L.J. 29-112 (2012). 
50 Another regulatory option to overcome the risk of insolvency of insurers is governmental insurance or 
governmental bailout for cyber risks with a catastrophic upside. 
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not allow insurers to differentiate their products and might hinder the development of a free 
and open market. The fast changing nature of cyber products and the specific character of 
cyber threats, being different for each type of company, are also important argument for 
tailor-made insurance contracts. Recent US cases point out that it is important that cyber 
insurance contracts contain very precise coverage clauses in order to ensure legal security and 
prevent interpretation arguments. 51 At the same time, extensive formulations and exclusions 
could restrict the applicability of the insurance clauses, especially in the light of the fast 
changing nature of cyber risks. 
 Within cyber insurance, the extent to which an insurer accepts the transfer of risks 
depends on its own risk preference and on its ability to effectively mitigate and disentangle 
the correlation between various cyber risks. Insurers can take measures to reduce the 
correlated character of risks, by, among others, getting more customers and diversify among 
operating systems, sectors and countries.52 So, which risks should a cyber insurer include, 
and which risk should a cyber insurer exclude? In a social optimal situation, insurers solely 
exclude cyber risks that have a high likelihood of affecting their solvency and liquidity. It 
could be that, due to the lack of data, insurers could have false impressions that certain cyber 
risks are strongly correlated and may severely impact solvency and liquidity, while they in 
fact are bearable. In that sense, social gains can mostly be realized if insurers exclude risks 
that they in fact can bear.. For instance, when insurers indeed have few customers, how likely 
is it that correlated risks indeed affect their solvency ratio’s, which might justify low caps? It 
is important to note in this respect that this research focuses on the analysis of cyber 
insurance contracts. Hence this set-up cannot observe the insurance pool, apart from 
anecdotal evidence about the number of clients that insurers indicate themselves. This implies 
that this research cannot observe the insurers efforts to reduce the correlated character of its 
risk by diversification. The research setup can, however, implicitly observe the insurers 
efforts to enlarge its pool and thus diversify, by observing the attractiveness of its insurance 
products to potential customers.  
 In the field of cyber security risks, with limited information about risks forecasts and 
the degree of correlation, one might expect that risk averse insurers would prefer the 
                                                
51 Travelers Indemnity Co. of America v. Portal Healthcare Solutions LLC, case number 14-1944, in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; Recall Total Information Management Inc. et al. v. Federal Insurance 
Co. et al., case number SC19291, in the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
52 Although the Internet is borderless, its diversification among countries would probably still reduce the 
correlation between risks as for instance some sorts of cybercrime tend to be targeted at specific countries or 
subsets of industries. 
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likelihood of covering too little (and gain less market share) over the likelihood of covering 
too much (and ultimately risk insolvency). Hence, the expectation is that the contracts offered 
in the market still deviate from the social optimum. This means that they would have (i) 
relatively low caps on payable sums, in the sense that for the insured there is still a significant 
residual uninsured risk; and (ii) exclusion clauses of catastrophic and/or correlated risks, as 
well as exclusions for risks that are reasonably believed to be non-catastrophic or not 
extremely correlated, incented by the aforementioned private optimum of the insurer. 
 
B. Prices and Competitors 
Besides looking at cyber insurance contracts, as a side effect, this case study also has the 
possibility to observe prices and the number of competitors in the market. This section 
discusses what currently is known about the prices and competitors in the market in order to 
formulate expectations about the market. Subsequently, we argue that the nature of cyber 
risks has a large influence on prices and competition.  
 In the US cyber insurance market, the annual gross premiums written are an estimated 
1.3 billion USD and growing 10-25% yearly,53 and 32% in 2014.54 Simultaneously, the 
premiums in the US are going down from 4.5-5% of the amount covered in 1999 and 1-2.5% 
in 2000 to 0.50-6.00% in 2004.55 Estimates of the fraction of US firms that has purchased 
cyber insurance in 2013 vary between 6 and 19%.56 There are huge differences between 
sectors, running from 1-2% of firms in the manufacturing and health sector to 20% in the 
financial sector.57  
 Although exact sales figures vary, the European market for cyber insurances has 
evolved over the past ten years, possibly driven by the implementation of further reaching 
                                                
53 Richard S. Betterley, Cyber/Privacy Insurance Market Survey 2013, The Betterley Report (2013), 
http://betterley.com/samples/cpims13_nt.pdf (accessed 21 March 2016). 
54 Peter J. Beshar, Protecting America from Cyber-Attacks: The Importance of Information Sharing, US Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, hearing U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security (2015), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/protecting-america-from-cyber-attacks-the-
importance-of-information-sharing (accessed 21 March 2016). 
55 Luzwick, and Kesan et al., supra note 1. 
56 Willis (2013) estimates that 6-10% of the US firms purchased cyber insurance whereas the Harvard Business 
Review (2013) reports that 19% has done so. Willis, Willis Fortune 1000 Cyber Disclosure Report (2013), 
http://blog.willis.com/downloads/cyber-disclosure-fortune-1000/ (accessed 21 March 2016); Harvard 
Business Review, Meeting the cyber risk challenge (2012), 
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/public-
sector/Meeting%20the%20Cyber%20Risk%20Challenge%20-%20Harvard%20Business%20Review%20-
%20Zurich%20Insurance%20group.pdf, (accessed 21 March 2016). 
57 Willis, supra note 56. 
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data breach notification laws.58 Especially financial institutions regard cyber risk as a very 
important risk to deal with.59 In 2013, approximately 10% of European firms was actually 
insured.60 The annual gross premiums written equal 192 million USD in 2013 and are 
expected to reach 1.1 billion USD in 2018.61 
 For the Netherlands, no sales figures are available. The Dutch Association of Insurers 
concludes that cyber risks are by far not as insured as in the US,62 even though, according to 
the association, cyber-crime in the Netherlands is estimated to cause at least 13 billion USD 
in losses, possibly even two or three times as much.63 However, there are also scientific 
studies that stress the systematic overstatement of the cost of cybercrime.64 ‘Anecdotal 
evidence’ indeed suggests that cyber insurance is not widely used in the Netherlands, 
especially when it concerns SMEs. Hiscox only encountered two claims for their DataRisk 
policy in their first two years of service.65 An underwriter of Chubb Specialty Insurance 
interviewed in August 2015 indicates off the record that annually ten policies are sold. An 
HDI-Gerling underwriter observes that firms are interested in cyber insurance but that few 
policies are actually sold. We co-designed a survey among owners SMEs that did undergo an 
ethical hack.66  This survey revealed that Dutch SMEs have little interest in cyber insurance. 
Only 11% of the respondents indicated to consider purchasing cyber insurance, just minutes 
after their systems were hacked by hackers with their consent. A sales agent of Zurich that 
was interviewed, off the record, for this research stated that the costs of cyber insurance 
                                                
58 ENISA, supra note 2. 
59 Judy Greenwald, Financial institutions identify cyber risk as major concern: Survey, Business Insurance 2014
 http://www.businessinsurance.com/Article/20141023/NEWS07/141029882, (accessed 21 March 2016).  
60Marsh, 2013 Cyber Risk Survey Marsh Ltd. (2013), 
https://www.marsh.com/content/dam/marsh/Documents/PDF/UK-en/Cyber%20Risk%20Survey%2006-
2013.pdf (accessed 21 March 2016). 
61 NAIC, Cyber Risk (2013), http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_risk.htm,(accessed 21 March 2016).  
62 Verbond van Verzekeraars, Virtuele risico's, echte schade, Hiscox Netherlands (2013), 
http://www.hiscox.nl/sites/www.hiscoxnl.com/files/filedepot/cyber-risks-informatie.pdf.pdf (accessed 21 
March 2016).   
63 Van de Laar, supra note 1. 
64 Markus Riek, Rainer Böhme, Michael Ciere, Carlos Ganan & Michel van Eeten, Estimating the Costs of 
Consumer-Facing Cybercrime: A Tailored Instrument and Representative Data for Six EU Countries, Working 
paper TU Delft (2016). 
65 Id . 
66 Dutch Network Group, Grip op Cybercrime in Ondernemend Nederland  (2016) 
http://www.dutchnetworkgroup.com/2878/grip-cybercrime-ondernemend-nederland.htm , (accessed 20 
September 2016). The Authors co-designed this survey together with the Dutch association for SMEs 
(MKB Nederland).  
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outweigh the benefits for small and medium companies. Also literature suggests that 
premiums are too high for SMEs.67  
Currently, according to scholars in the market, a lack of actuarial data68 about cyber 
incidents makes it impossible for insurers to accurately calculate cyber risk and loss 
potential.69 Given the relative youth of the Internet and cyber insurance, there is simply only 
limited actuarial historical data available. Moreover, incidents are scarce or major devastating 
incidents did not even happen.70 The lack of good quality actuarial data about cyber incidents 
hinders forecasts.71 In addition, there is also a risk of change, in the sense that the cyber 
security landscape and its risks can change very rapidly and past data loses its value quickly 
to accurately forecast future risks.72 Moreover, as discussed in section II.A, cyber risks are 
correlated risks, which means that incidents do not always emerge independent of each other. 
Lack of data, the risk of change and the correlated character of cyber risks causes uncertainty 
about the distribution of risks in the future, which is of paramount importance in determining 
prices for insurance products. In the end, the lack of accurate cyber risk data and trustworthy 
future risk determination is widely discussed as the root cause for the slow development of 
the cyber insurance market.73  
 The question remains how insurers will respond pricewise to systemic uncertainties 
and what is a preferable reaction from a social welfare perspective. We sketch two scenarios. 
In the first scenario, insurers react to this uncertainty by increasing their premiums to reflect 
the uncertainty. Law and economics literature labels this ‘insurer ambiguity’.74 Insurer 
ambiguity follows the assumption that in situations where there is less insurability, insurers 
will increase the premium to incorporate the additional uncertainty.75 Insurer ambiguity will 
most likely result in a ‘Catch-22’: insurers need a frequently refreshed dashboard of actual 
claim data in order to deliver affordable insurance policies, but this data will not be available 
as long as insurers cannot offer affordable insurance policies. In such a scenario, competition 
                                                
67 Biener et al., supra note 2. 
68 Existing data breach notification data does not solve this problem: it is solely systematically recorded in the 
United States, but this dataset is incomplete because not all notifications are recorded and companies have an 
incentive to conceal data breaches. In addition, data breach is only a fraction of insurable risk. 
69 William Yurcik & David Doss, CyberInsurance: A Market Solution to the Internet Security Market Failure, 
Paper presented at 1st 2002 Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), Berkeley, CA (2002).   
70 Id . 
71 Id . 
72Tajalizadehkhoob et al., supra note 14. 
73 ENISA, and Biener et al., supra note 2. 
74 Kunreuther et al., supra note 43. 
75 Prices can also be high because of insufficient competition. Avraham mentions capital requirements, unfair 
competition or regulatory standards. See note 49. 
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would develop likewise very slowly. Due to the lack of data, the fact that the pooling 
opportunities in a small market are limited,76 and the correlated risks in cyber security,77 we 
expect that, in this scenario, only few insurers offering cyber insurance. 78  Limited 
competition and the aforementioned insurer ambiguity in turn can result in high prices, as the 
market possibly is not competitive enough when the number of suppliers is low. 
 In the second scenario, insurers primarily react to the opportunities the emerging new 
cyber insurance market bring in the sense that new products can be developed, new 
insurances can be signed and more revenue can be made. In this scenario, insurers will 
penetrate the market aggressively by a low price/coverage ratio to gain market share despite 
risk of systemic uncertainties.79 Fierce competition will break through the ‘Catch-22’, since 
in the struggle of gaining market share, insurers will attract customers and hence claim data, 
which will lower information unavailability and uncertainty. Because most traditional 
insurances focus on high impact/low likelihood risks, they are often are able to build products 
with very attractive premiums with respect to the downside that is covered. For instance, as 
an illustration, premiums for liability insurance for SMEs can be €150.04 per year, and 
0.003% of the insured amount.80 Although aggressive pricing strategies in a very competitive 
market can help to lower prices, such low prices can only be achieved if cyber insurance 
covers only high (on a company level, maybe even catastrophic) impact, low likelihood risks, 
following from the discussion in III.A.     
 Hence, the second scenario is preferable from a social welfare perspective, because in 
such as situation welfare enhancing risk transfer and subsequently risk reduction measures 
can be taken. In such a situation we expect primarily large and diversified insurance 
companies entering the market, because they can afford to take potential losses when 
penetrating the market.  
 The expectations regarding prices and competition can be summarized as follows, 
depending on the strategy followed by insurers: (i) pricing models do not function well as 
there is only limited data and there is much uncertainty about the exact risks involved.81 
                                                
76 Yurcik & Doss, supra note 71. 
77 Hulisi Öğüt,  Srinivasan Raghunathan, and Nirup M. Menon, Cyber Security Risk Management: Public Policy 
Implications of Correlated Risk, Imperfect Ability to Prove Loss, and Observability of Self-Protection, 31 
RISK ANALYSIS 3, 497-512 (2011).  
78 Van de Laar, supra note 1. 
79 And taking relatively few adverse selection measures to increase the insurance pool even further.  
80 An ‘MKB Meerkeuzepolis’ of Achmea in 2015 with an insurable amount of 5 million euro. Details available 
upon request. 
81 Shackelford, supra note 32; Betterley, supra note 53. 
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Insurer ambiguity therefore causes relatively high premiums and limited competition;82 and 
(ii) insurance companies entering the market want to gain market share and hence offer 
relatively low prices. Competition is mainly amongst large and diversified insurance 
companies. 
 
C. Adverse Selection 
For insurance in general, and for cyber insurance specifically, adverse selection is an 
impediment for market development. 83  Adverse selection results from the information 
advantage of the insured that he strategically can exploit before the contract is signed.84 
Adverse selection is caused by the fact that the insurer does not have full information about 
the characteristics of the insured that determine its risk, before the contract is signed.85 86 
Therefore (some) characteristics of the insurer, important for risk determination, remain 
undisclosed. This does not mean that an insurer cannot make a risk profile at all. Regarding 
cyber risks for instance, the sector in general might be an indicator of increased risk. One 
might regard online gambling and adult industries as high risk industries, but also law firms 
that deal with personally sensitive data. But in most cases, an insurer with increased cyber 
risk is not so easy to detect. Detecting vulnerabilities and potential exploits might be time-
consuming, technically complicated, and hence costly. Therefore, it is impossible to calculate 
an insurance premium that is perfectly fine-tuned to risks specifically for the individual 
insured. 
 Adverse selection has important consequences for the insurance pool. As an effect of 
the inability to tie premiums to individual risk profiles, the premium is based on the average 
risk distribution in the pool. Consequently, low risk insured firms, which may have better 
information themselves about their own risk, might find this average premium too high for 
their individual expected risk and as a result drop out of the pool. Simultaneously, firms with 
a risk above average are more likely to buy cyber insurance. For example, firms that have 
experienced cyber incidents will probably be more willing to buy cyber insurance, and if 
these incidents where due to a suboptimal state of security, this increases the average risk in 
                                                
82 Biener et al., supra note 2. 
83 Böhme & Schwartz, supra note 2. 
84 For cyber risks specifically, it is doubtful whether the information advantage of the insured towards the 
insurer really is that large. Will ex ante high risk SMEs indeed know that they have outdated computer systems, 
or that they behave more carelessly? This question is still unanswered in the literature.  
85 Akerlof, supra note 41 ; p.320ff in Zweifel and Eisen, supra note 31. 
86 Böhme & Schwartz assume this in their cyber insurance framework. See note 2. 
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the pool.87 An increase of average risk in the pool might force the insurer to increase 
premiums, after which firms with relatively low risks that were left might decide to leave the 
pool, which increases the risk in the pool even further, et cetera. Due to this adverse 
selection, low risk actors might not be able to buy insurance coverage against a fair premium 
(based on their expected risk), which reduces social welfare.88 
 There are various contractual solutions that mitigate the effect of adverse selection in 
cyber insurance. We discuss the desirability of exclusion clauses, application forms and 
deductibles.89 In general, the intensity of measures to reduce adverse selection negatively 
affects the size of the insurance pool. This will reduce the ability of insurers to gather enough 
data and accurately estimate risk distribution in the pool.  The trade-off between reducing 
adverse selection and improving data is similar to what the discussion in section III.A on 
coverage and prices. The adverse selection measures aimed at aligning risks in the insurance 
pool has the costs of leaving insurance pools small and hence retrieving less data which is 
needed for a mature cyber insurance market. Hence, severe exclusion or measures to select 
low risk insured firms in the pool may limit the amount of data that will be collected and 
might not be desirable in a socially optimal situation. 
 From the various contractual solutions that mitigate adverse selection, exclusion 
clauses are probably the most uncomplicated. Exclusion clauses simply exclude certain 
categories of insured from having a particular form of insurance because they (are perceived 
to) have an above average risk. Because of their simplicity and conventionality, we expect 
insurers to include exclusion clauses for general types of business, especially for companies 
with a high risk profile such as online gambling and adult industry.  
 A more sophisticated way of exclusion is to exclude certain types of behavior. These 
are exclusions in case the insured does not fulfill the requirements set by the insurer 
concerning protection and updating standards. In practice, insurers in the past rarely 
differentiated premiums depending on the security practices of their clients.90  
 Incorporating too many exclusion clauses in the contract has a negative social effect, 
as it might exclude high risk insureds. When high risk insureds are excluded from a risk pool, 
                                                
87 Shackelford, supra note 32. 
88 However, this problem is partly mitigated through propitious selection: the fact that low risk actors might be 
more risk averse and high risk actors are more risk prone, and hence they both opt for the same pool which will 
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89 This means this Article leaves many other adverse selection measures out of the scope of this discussion, for 
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the insurer has no incentive to reduce these risks, while this might be just the types of entities 
at which risk reduction is most welfare enhancing since there is many potential for 
improvement. Moreover, uninsured high risk insureds can negatively affect the risk of 
insured low risk insurers due to correlations of risk. Internalization of this risk by including 
these entities in the risk pool on the other hand internalizes these externalities gives extra 
incentives for the insurer to reduce risk in the pool.  
 Nevertheless, in a social optimum some actions should be taken by insurance 
companies to limit adverse selection problems. One way to tackle these problems is by 
identifying firm's risk characteristics through application forms. Not to exclude them but, to a 
certain extent, to tie premiums to the perceived risk profile. It is questionable how 
trustworthy and necessary very extensive application forms are, as one might argue that many 
SMEs do not have sufficient knowledge about their cyber risks themselves and might be 
overoptimistic regarding their cyber secure situation. Furthermore, extensive forms limit easy 
access to insurance products, which slows market growth. Concluding: in an ideal situation 
forms may be short and just require basic questions, such as the number of employees, 
turnover and sector. 
 The height of the deductible is an also an implicit way to identify and exclude high 
risk or risk averse entities. Different deductibles can have a signaling function of the 
perception of risk attitude.91 Section III.A suggested that high deductibles may be beneficial 
for the development of the market because premiums can be low and a relatively large upside 
can be covered. When one wants to focus on the insurance pool growth, however, low 
deductibles are preferred because high deductibles are believed to implicitly exclude high 
risk entities. Hence, there is a trade-off between coverage, prices and deductibles. Section 
III.E provides an additional discussion about deductibles in the context of moral hazard. 
 From the perspective of the insurance company, risk classification is a desirable way 
to reduce adverse selection problems. Through an identification of risk before the contract is 
written, different firms can be placed in different risk pools with corresponding premiums 
and coverage clauses. This differentiation avoids cross-subsidization of low-risk entities 
towards high-risk entities, as well as too large discrepancies between the expected risk of 
individual firms and the average risk in the pool.92  
 Again, the expectations about which adverse selection measures in the policies would 
lead to a private optimum for the insurance companies are two-fold, and depend on the 
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insurers' risk profile. A risk prone insurer strives for enough market share and chooses to 
reduce adverse selection measures. In this private optimum, the insurance company will 
probably offer easy requesting procedures and low deductibles and exclude little to none risk 
categories. A risk averse insurer is probably much more concerned with the correlated nature 
of cyber risks, and is eager to know a lot about potential clients through extensive cyber 
security audits before the contract is written. 93  Here an auditing agency performs an 
extensive and costly inspection of the security behavior of an organization. The agency 
informs the insurer, who in turn designs the contract tailored to the firm specifics. Another 
possibility for risk averse insurers to acquire information is via the requesting procedure. For 
this type of insurance companies, we expect a complicated and extensive requesting 
procedure.  
 Ultimately, more risk prone insurers will contribute to social welfare because they 
will generate more clients which enables a better risk pool and more subsequently more claim 
data which enables better insights on how to reduce risk. The main trade-off for those risk 
prone insurers is to choose between high or low deductibles in relation with market share and 
price. From a social welfare perspective, high deductibles would be preferable to low 
deductibles. High deductibles reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, move the insurance 
products more in a low likelihood high impact category and enable the insurer to offer lower 
prices. 
 
D. Reverse Adverse Selection 
Although there is little data available about the cyber insurance market,94 insurers do have 
more information about incidents than their customers. Insurers have data of the combined 
claims of their customers, and they can put more resources in understanding the value of each 
coverage clause than potential insured can.  This information asymmetry could elicit strategic 
behavior of the insurance companies: they could strategically impose barriers for consumers 
to assess premiums on high or low quality. Also they can deliberately exaggerate cyber 
security risk as a marketing strategy to make it harder for consumers to make an informed 
choice and assess which types of coverage they really need.95 When there is an information 
surplus at the side of the insurers and it is costly for potential insured firms to acquire this 
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information, insurers can use this advantage to reduce adverse selection. Eventually, 
insurance companies could use their information surplus to reversely adversely select their 
customers, 96 and actively sustain the 'market for lemons' in the sense that insurers present 
their coverage clauses in a way that is difficult to understand for SMEs, not being cyber 
experts. In the long run, this behavior would lead to a race to the bottom with low quality 
insurance products.  
 Although the previous scenario might lead to a private optimum for insurance 
companies, reverse adverse selection should be cancelled out to reach a social optimum. 
Transparency in the applicability and limits of the insurance contracts is the key concept in 
counteracting reverse adverse selection.97 This way, relatively uninformed firms looking for 
cyber insurance are also able to make an informed choice and understand the value of the 
coverage. Recent case law in the United States regarding cyber insurance underlines the 
importance of policies with clear and appropriate (cyber-specific) language and unambiguous 
coverage boundaries.98 Fixed contracts, with fixed coverage clauses, can aid in reducing 
reverse adverse selection. However, as is discussed in section III.A, tailor made contracts 
allow for more flexibility that might be needed in the fast changing nature of the internet. 
 
E. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard occurs after the insurance contract is closed.99  The insured might start 
behaving differently (i.e. take less care) because he does not bear the losses of a damaging 
event himself anymore.100  It is too costly for the insurer to perfectly monitor the behavior of 
the insured, which can therefore exhibit these hidden actions. This influences the expected 
losses, so that the insurance premium has to rise. Regarding the problem of moral hazard, 
three types are relevant for the cyber insurance market.101 First, the insured party can take 
fewer precautions against the insured risk, leading to ex-ante moral hazard. Second, the 
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insured may take insufficient measures to mitigate potential losses in the event of an insured 
occurrence: ex-post moral hazard. Third, an insured party could increase losses in order to 
secure larger reimbursements under an insurance contract, which essentially is fraud. The 
situation of network security interdependence that is distinctive for cyber security, magnifies 
the moral hazard effect as everyone is interlinked.102 In case insurers are not able to 
distinguish between insured companies that take proper care measures and companies that do 
not, insurers charge higher premiums to all insured firms,103 which again may trigger adverse 
selection and low risk insurers to drop out of the pool.  
This section focuses on requirements in contracts aiming to mitigate the first two 
types of moral hazard. The main social welfare enhancement is realized by the fact that 
insurers can transfer information about cyber security to the insured. For instance, the insurer 
may require the insured to take specific care measures, and decline or lower payout in case 
the care measures are not implemented or not taken sufficiently. Another  socially desirable 
moral hazard measure is information sharing among insurance companies.104 When they 
anonymously share information as historical loss data, claim histories, and compliance audits 
through an independent, government funded information sharing platform, individual 
premiums can be adjusted contingent on a corresponding investment in information security 
infrastructure. Accordingly, insurers reduce their own risk of loss and create economic 
incentive for insured to adequately secure consumer information. Besides, the existence of 
such an information sharing network lowers the entry costs of the cyber insurance market for 
interested insurance companies. Additional insurers can compete with current market 
participants creating a more competitive market place, leading to increase in risk adjustment 
and underwriting protocols, and increasingly affordable cyber insurance policies.105  
 We expect individual insurance companies to impose measures in their contracts to 
counteract moral hazard incented behavior of the insured, including partial coverage, caps on 
payable sums, co-insurance and deductibles.106  Moreover, insurance companies most likely 
                                                
102 Nikhil Shetty, Galina Schwartz, Mark Felegyhazi & Jean Walrand, Competitive Cyber-Insurance and 
Internet Security, in T. Moore, D. Pym, and C. Ioannidis, eds., Economics of Information Security and 
Orivacy,  New York: Springer, pp. 229-247 (2010). 
103 Avraham, supra note 49. 
104 Bailey, supra note 103. 
105 Despite the theoretical value of this approach towards information sharing, the practical value seems to be 
limited from a practical point of view: early market participants are in this set-up asked to share their data 
(which they have gathered in an undeveloped and possibly risky insurance market) with other insurers such that 
these can take position in the market and compete with sharp prices. Nevertheless, insurance companies do not 
appear to be willing to share data as these figures are part of their core business. 
106 Shavell, supra note 41; Shavell, supra note 13; Wagner, supra note 31. 
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require certain care measures from their clients, and that careless behavior from the side of 
the insured will lead to (partly) exclusion from payment. In order to combat ex-post moral 
hazard, we expect insurance clauses that partially expose the insured party to risk,107 via caps 
on payable sums and deductibles for the same reason. In order to mitigate ex-ante moral 
hazard, we expect that the insurer differentiates premiums based on the security practices of 
the insured party,108 and based on feature and experienced risk rating methodologies.109 
Further fine-tuning of the premium could be reached via bonus/malus arrangements or no-
claim discounts. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This case study selected cyber insurance contracts for SMEs to compare actual offers to 
theoretical framework. Moreover, the focus lays on the Dutch market. The Netherlands is an 
example of a European country with a well-developed digital infrastructure and it is 
connected to other EU Member States through the EU internal market. Insurers that offer 
cyber insurance in the Netherlands are large international insurance companies. Thus, results 
might differ quantitatively across countries in the EU, but qualitatively, the conclusions can 
be generalized to other countries in the EU and/or with a highly developed digital economy, 
such as the US. The focus lies on SMEs because they are an important part of the Dutch 
society. About 99% of the Dutch companies are SMEs and SMEs have a share of 60% in 
Dutch GDP.110 Moreover, SMEs are vulnerable for cyber-attacks while, because of their size, 
specified protection products may be produced insufficiently and SMEs themselves lack 
understanding of cyber security risks.111 Also, because of the interrelatedness of cyber 
security risks, improving the ‘weakest links’ potentially also benefits better protected large 
companies, for instance when SMEs function as a back door to infiltrate larger companies.  
                                                
107 Faure & Hartlief, supra note 27 . 
108 Shetty et al., supra note 104. 
109 Bailey, supra note 103. 
110 Jan De Kok, Yvonne Prince & Tommy Span, De bijdrage van het MKB aan de Nederlandse economie, 
Zoetermeer: Panteia  (2015). 
111 PGI Cyber, SMEs are Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks (August 2015), 
https://pgicyber.com/NewsandEvents/SMEs-are-vulnerable-to-Cyber-Attacks (visited September 20, 
2016); Jessica Fino, Vast Majority of SMEs Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks and IT Threats, Survey Finds 
(July 2016) http://economia.icaew.com/news/july-2016/smes-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks-and-it-threats 
(visited September 20, 2016). 
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 The authors requested cyber insurance contracts on behalf of six firms. Three firms 
are currently operating in the Netherlands and three organizations are artificially 
constructed:112 
• Arbinn is a small consultancy company for the energy- & utility sector 
• Banketbakkerij de Waal (artificially constructed) is a Dutch local bakery 
• Desiderius (artificially constructed) is a tax advice company for Dutch SMEs 
• Eigensteil is a full-service Internet company, focusing on graphic design and software 
development 
• FaceXXX (artificially constructed) is a Dutch adult industry website  
• Unibarge is a logistic operator in the Rotterdam harbor 
The firms vary in size and dependency on IT infrastructure, in order to analyze 
whether insurers differentiate their offers. Eigensteil and Desiderius are the only two firms 
with a turnover of higher than 1 million euros. Banketbakkerij de Waal has a low Internet 
dependency, Unibarge, Arbinn and Desiderius have a medium Internet dependency and 
FaceXXX and Eigensteil have a high Internet dependency.   
For each of these companies, the Authors requested insurance offers from nine 
insurers offering cyber insurance to European SMEs: ACE, AIG, Allianz, AON, CNA, 
Chubb, Hiscox, HDI-Gerling and XL. HDI-Gerling only offered a policy focusing on Internet 
banking fraud at the time of the empirical observation. To the best of the Authors knowledge 
all insurance companies operating on the Dutch market are approached. 
The overview of typical cyber insurance policies in Biener et al. (2015) is the starting 
point for the analysis of coverage clauses.113 This framework scores policies on types of 
coverage (e.g. network security liability and business interruption), causes of cyber loss (e.g. 
hacking and insertion of computer viruses), and insured losses (e.g. loss of profit and legal 
liabilities).  In addition, the Authors documented policy exclusions and conditions that 
deviate from those in other policies. 
For purposes of comparison, similar amounts for coverage, deductibles and caps were 
requested. In case of standardized policies with limited choice, this was not possible. The 
insurance application process was registered as well.  
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
                                                
112 An extensive description of the organizations is available upon request.  
113 Biener et al., supra note 2. 
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This section presents the main findings of the case study. The presentation of results and 
discussion follows the chronological process of the purchase of cyber insurance. First, the 
requesting procedure is discused, followed by the price of the product and subsequently 
coverage, caps & deductibles and risk reduction measures. The discussion is ended with a 
more high level synthesis of insurers and their strategies.  
 
A. Requesting Procedure 
AON and Hiscox do not check a cyber insurance request ex ante and enable signing an online 
contract immediately. AIG and Chubb require filling out a 7- or 11-page request form with 
questions concerning information security policies, personnel hiring practices, premises -, 
web server -, and mobile device security, service providers, PCI -, and HIPAA compliance,114 
written records management, and data breach incident response. The other insurance 
companies gather information through their brokers, which require more detailed 
information. In 80% of the cases it was difficult and time consuming to request insurance 
offers from the insurer, which is illustrated by the fact that it took the Authors four months to 
get an overview of the available offers in the market.  
 On forehand, insurers do not exclude firms as such from cyber insurance. They rather 
exclude certain damages, claims and other losses that follow from specific activities. Three of 
the policies the Authors received contain adverse selection clauses. Allianz, Hiscox, and LIU 
exclude gambling activities. In addition, Allianz excludes adult businesses as well. AON and 
Chubb do not have adverse selection clauses, but state explicitly in their cyber product 
brochures that they are cautious of credit card companies, data aggregators and warehouses, 
payroll processing, gaming and social networks (Chubb) and firms active in the field of 
gambling, jackpots and porn (AON). Consequently, firms operating in these businesses may 
not be interested in insurance from these insurers. None of the insurances extensively 
evaluated the security practices with an in-house assessment; insurers apparently are 
convinced that request forms provide sufficient information to offer coverage.  
 With regard to ex ante requesting cyber insurance, we observe two elements. First, we 
observe both easy to fill in, as well as complicated and extensive requesting procedures, 
which would indicate that indeed insurers are either following the strategy of gaining quick 
market share or rigorous risk control. However, a differentiation of premiums based on the 
                                                




estimated ex ante cyber risk of the insured is not observed. In other words, there are currently 
no adverse selection measures apart from the exclusions mentioned and differences in the 
choice of deductibles. This is especially interesting because as mentioned, some insurers 
indeed requested much information about the state of security of their potential clients, but 
are not using it.  
 
B. Premiums 
The results show that premiums for firms with a turnover below 1 million are 0.26-0.53% of 
the insured amounts. For companies with a turnover above 1 million, they are 0.32-0.99%. 
Thus, premiums vary between 0.26% and 0.99% of the insured amount. Table 2 presents an 
overview. Figure 1 shows a clustering of premiums between 0.30% and 0.40%. Premiums in 
the Dutch market in 2015 hence are two times lower than the US amounts in 2004 on the low 
end, and six times as low on the high end. The average annual premium for small companies 
for €250,000 coverage is €1,000, which does not seem insurmountable. Still, as an 
illustration, premiums for liability insurance for small companies are much lower, e.g. 
€150.04 per year, with a coverage of €2,000,000.115 This, of course, does not imply that cyber 
insurance is too expensive, because for such an evaluation one needs to know the loss ratios 
(losses of accepted claims divided by premiums). Unfortunately, besides anecdotal ‘off the 
record’ evidence, there is no information on these loss ratios.116 
 
- insert Table 2 about here- 
None of the contracts contained any clauses concerning some bonus/malus system in which 
no-claim behavior is rewarded with lower premiums and vice versa. The small differences 
between premiums offered for different turnovers also indicate that insurers are not interested 
in behavior-based premium differentiation or that they simply do not have the right data and 
tools to do so.  
 
                                                
115 An ‘MKB Meerkeuzepolis’ of Achmea in 2015 with an insurable amount of 5 million euro. Details available 
upon request. 
116 The Authors asked insurers for the loss ratio and received off the record indications of a loss ratio of 10%, 




We scored the various policies according to the framework of elements in ‘typical cyber 
insurance policies’ designed by Biener et al.117 There are six different complete coverage 
clauses of seven insurers for observation. AIG and AON use the same policy, XL did not 
provide a policy and HDI-Gerling solely offers Internet banking insurance. The first three 
columns of Table 3 present a brief description of the insurable elements. The last column 
indicates how many insurers out of seven provide coverage for each type. 118  
 
- insert Table 3 about here - 
 
All insurers in principle cover first party damage and third party liabilities, however 
they differ in the specific coverage limits and causes: there is variation in coverage for losses 
caused by employees, systems or third parties. These distinctions might be explained by the 
insurer's desire to discourage careless behavior of the insured. Business interruption because 
of non-usable ICT services for example, is not covered by Hiscox and Allianz in case the 
interruption is caused by activities of the insured or security errors. Despite this exclusion, 
there are no indications that the premiums of these two insurers are lower than those of other 
insurers. Allianz and Chubb both cover loss of income due to business interruption. However, 
Allianz only covers this when caused by a third party, whereas Chubb also covers it when 
caused by the insured or a security error.119 This ‘devil in the details’ matters for instance 
when one considers insurance for damage resulting from outsourced IT activities. Solely two 
out of seven insurers cover this vicarious liability, while many SMEs outsource IT activities.  
The coverage for losses and expenses following from the insured activities varies a lot 
across insurers. For example, both HDI-Gerling and Chubb provide first-party coverage for 
loss of personal data caused by the insurer. HDI-Gerling covers expenses for forensic 
investigation, PR-advice, legal advice and privacy notification. Chubb covers the same 
expenses, but also an incident response team, temporary capacity, credit control and digital 
asset replacement. Crisis control and legal liability, in the context of privacy violation, are 
covered by all insurers, but the coverage width differs strongly across the insurers. For 
example, two of them (ACE and Chubb) explicitly exclude the insurance of regulatory fines, 
                                                
117 Biener et al., supra note 2. 
118 The detailed comparison is displayed in Table A1 to A6 in the appendix of this paper. 
119 The detailed comparison is displayed in Table A1 to A6 in the appendix of this paper. 
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which have become higher in a European context. Thus, there are substantial differences 
regarding (among others) coverage of expert fees and data recovery costs.  
 Regarding first party liability, all insurers cover crisis management expenses and data 
reinstatement costs. On the other hand, replacement of intellectual property, such as software, 
is covered by half of the insurers although this kind of reinstatement might be time-
consuming and costly. Five out of seven insurers cover actual extortion payments in case of 
cyber extortion but related costs for investigation and prevention are only covered by two of 
them. 
 At first sight, cyber insurance coverage might look similar, but on closer scrutiny 
many differences in clauses exist. A direct comparison on multiple criteria such as price, 
coverage and deductibles is complex. Each insurance company takes its own approach 
towards the set-up of the contract, legal terms are explained in multiple ways by different 
insurers, and long lists of exceptions for coverage exist. Due to these differences in the 
details, it might be difficult for SMEs to acquire enough information to make an educated 
choice for insurance. This holds even more now most insurers solely communicate through 
intermediaries. Coverage is difficult to compare, not only for companies looking for 
insurance, but also for experts. The Authors requested experts to group insurable losses in the 
order of importance, and they responded that they found it too difficult to rank them.120 This 
lack of uniformity complicates making a well-considered choice for a specific cyber 
insurance product, especially for relatively uninformed SMEs. This difficulty for potential 
insured to assess and compare policies, might indicate that reverse adverse selection is 
present. Another explanation might be that due to the complex nature of cyber risks, the 
insurer want to precisely define their coverage, also demanded by recent case law in the 
United States, as discussed in section.  
 Do insurers cover risks that have a likelihood of affecting their liquidity and solvency, 
as discussed in section III.A? Every insurer covers at least some risks that are potentially 
harmful for the stability of the risk pool of an insurer, when a correlated event happens. For 
instance, all parties incur costs for the reinstatement and replacement of data. These are costs 
that could be correlated when there is an exploit in a software application. Indeed, the 
coverage of cyber insurance inherently means that insurers to some degree must accept 
correlated risks. There are very few types of coverage that actually cancel out the likelihood 
that other parties would be affect simultaneously. This means that insurers are willing to take 
                                                
120 More information about this exploratory survey upon request. 
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some risk. A few parties are willing to take a higher degree of risk, in the sense that they also 
cover privacy liability when control of information is outsourced. This makes them 
potentially vulnerable for vulnerabilities in cloud platforms. Apart from that, all insurers 
cover risks that are typically uncorrelated, such as reputation damage. Some insurers also 
cover administrative fines. As section V.B discusses, insurers impose caps on payable sums, 
which is also considered a means to reduce the risk on insolvency flowing from catastrophic 
cyber incidents.  
 
D. Caps and Deductibles 
All insurers use caps. With most insurers, the insured can choose the insured amount, with 
the cap as maximum. The premium depends on the insured amount. For small companies, 
caps vary between €250,000 and €1,000,000. For large companies, there are observed caps 
up to €2,500,000. Indeed insurers partially expose insured to risk via caps on payable 
amounts.  
  
- insert Figure 1 about here- 
 
 Figure 1 indicates that the deductibles vary between 1,000 and 100,000 euro, or 
between 0.40% and 4.00% of the insured amount. It can hence be rewarding for companies 
interested in buying insurance to take the deductible into account in their choice. The 
question remains however, to what extent SMEs know their risk and can participate in this 
kind of self selection. For example, AON applies a deductible of 0.25% of the insured 
amount for a company with turnover below 1 million, while Chubb’s deductible for the same 
company is 2.50%. Most deductibles vary between 0.5% and 1% of the insured amount. It is 
common practice that deductibles have to be paid per insured event, not per year as might be 
the case in other fields of the industry. Although the precise contract conditions vary across 
the insurers, the difference in the height of the deductible of a factor ten suggests that insurers 
differ in the perception of risk attitude, that they target several parts of the market, and/or that 
they have different impressions of the degree of moral hazard of their customers. 
 The theoretical discussion in section III argued that from a social welfare perspective 
insurers might want to offer products with high deductibles and high caps because insured 
firms would like to insure low likelihood - high impact risks.  However, on the contrary, the 
contracts observed contain relatively low caps and low deductibles. Relatively low caps for 
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can hinder demand for cyber insurance, because high impact risks are insufficiently insured. 
Moreover, relatively low caps, such as €250,000, could refrain companies from claiming, 
when the expected damage is significantly higher than the cap and when this damage will 
solely operationalize when the breach is claimed and notified. Concealing notifications and 
refraining from claims can for instance be present when there is high reputation damage 
expected in combination with low caps and when this reputation damage can be avoided by 
concealing the breach. Low deductibles are on first sight attractive for buyers of cyber 
insurance, but not really necessary, since low impact risks are bearable by the SME itself. 
High deductibles on the other hand allow for lower prices, more customers and hence more 
data which might lead to a more attractive product and lower prices. 
 
E. Risk Reduction Measures 
Only AIG and ACE have positive moral hazard clauses that lay down general requirements 
for firms in order to receive compensation for losses. There is no relation between such 
clauses and the premium, and there are no bonus/malus arrangements identified. AIG 
requires that the insured party takes all 'reasonable steps' to meet the standards described in 
the request form. Data recovery possibilities have to be tested every six months. ACE 
requires that the insured party makes a back-up every week, of which a copy must be saved 
outside the firm in a location protected against fire and water. Permanent anti-virus software 
has to be installed and activated and weekly updated. The deliberate use of illegal or 
unlicensed programs is prohibited. So, only two out of the total of seven observed insurers 
aim to reduce risk at the insurer. Targeted risk reduction requirements are one of the main 
welfare enhancing capabilities of the insurer. In that sense the limited amount of risk 
reduction requirements is a missed opportunity. This can be caused by the fact that that 
limited claim data hinders cyber insurers to make accurate risk reduction requirements for the 
insurance pool.  This does not mean that other insurers do not have strategies at all to reduce 
the moral hazard problem. We did observe deductibles and caps, which are also considered to 
reduce moral hazard.  
 
F. Insurers and Their Strategies 
We observed nine insurers that offer cyber insurance policies for SMEs in the Netherlands. 
HDI-Gerling has a limited insurance product focusing on banking fraud, XL did not respond 
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to the request for a policy and AIG and AON offer identical products for different prices. 
Hence, de facto, there are six different insurers in the market when it comes to coverage. This 
is indeed a limited number when compared to other Dutch insurance sectors. The Dutch 
Association of Insurers reports 149 insurers active in the non-life sector. 121  Property 
insurance is offered by 78, liability insurance by 41 and motor vehicle insurance by 36 
insurers. All insurers that offer cyber policies are large insurance companies that are 
diversified and capable of taking some losses. 
 The question for discussion remains whether the cyber insurance market observed by 
this case study contributes to social welfare because of risk transfer and reduction. The 
discussion argues that there is currently a mixed view as to whether the market is capable of 
increasing social welfare. It is beyond dispute that the insurers observed apparently perceive 
opportunity for some producer surplus, in the sense that they are willing to penetrate the 
market by offering products. The main point for discussion is whether the insurance products 
are capable of breaking through the aforementioned ‘catch-22’ situation. The theoretical 
framework formulated two strategies that insurers can pursue. In the first scenario, risk prone 
insurers aggressively penetrate the market with easy requesting procedures and an attractive 
price/coverage ratio. In a second scenario, a risk averse insurer primarily focusses on offering 
products that mitigate its own risks by insurer ambiguity, high prices and rigorous adverse 
selection, possibly supported by sustaining a reverse market for lemons in order to maximize 
its own profits.  
 We observed some elements of the first scenario in actual cyber insurance contracts. 
For instance, AON and Hiscox offered very easy cyber insurance requesting procedures, a 
request can be sent through a simple e-form, aiming at an efficient customer journey and all 
insurers cover elements of first and third party coverage. We also observed elements of the 
second scenario, for instance because for other insurers than AON and Hiscox, requesting 
cyber insurance was a time consuming process. Chubb for instance requires much insight in 
the company (ten pages of questions about the current state of cyber protection have to be 
filled out). This possibly has negatively externalities towards insurers with an easy cyber 
insurance requesting procedure, as possible clients might want to compare more than two 
products and drop out of the pool.  
 Prices are closely related to deductibles and caps. It is impossible to assess whether 
prices are attractive enough for insurers, because only an actual market equilibrium could 
                                                
121 Verbond van Verzekeraars, supra note 62. 
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reveal that. Anecdotic evidence from insurers itself and the co-designed survey (see section 
III.B) suggests that at present SMEs have limited willingness to pay for cyber insurance. 
Possibly this is caused, among others, by the fact that prices still are too high and do not fall 
in a ‘nobrainer’ category such as the aforementioned prices for corporate liability insurance 
or property insurance.122 As argued, currently deductibles and caps are relatively low. From a 
social welfare perspective, one might want to increase the deductible (and cap) in order to 
shift the insurable risk into a more low likelihood high impact category.  
 De facto, a reverse market for lemons (reverse adverse selection) exists in the sense 
that insurance contracts are mostly difficult to request. Moreover, prices and coverage are 
difficult to compare. It took the Authors four months to get an overview of the market. For 
example, Hiscox and Chubb both offer cyber insurance in the Netherlands against 
comparable premiums: 0.34% and 0.35% of the insured amount. There are however 
considerable differences in deductibles (Hiscox 0.6% versus Chubb 2.5% of the insured 
amount). In addition, the exact coverage offered by the two insurers shows important 
differences.123 Hiscox covers administrative fines for non-compliance with Data Protection 
Law, while Chubb does not, and, vice versa, solely Chubb covers vicarious liability, when IT 
systems are outsourced. We could not observe however whether this 'market for lemons' is 
the consequence of a deliberate attempt to increase information asymmetry or whether it is a 
result of overall uncertainty or different strategies of insurers in the market. Insurers at the 
moment do not use standardized or identical coverage. This would increase competition 
because consumers can better compare coverage and pricing details and aggregate data in 
order to better protect risks. On the other hand, standard forms may also prevent competition 
and quick response to new developments in the market.124  
 A missed opportunity is the limited amount of risk reduction / moral hazard measures. 
As said, we only observed two companies that set incentives for careful behavior. This might 
also be caused by the fact that there is little claim data and hence little inferences could be 
made about which risk reduction requirements are effective for the insurance pool. 
 Overall, what can insurance law literature and legal practitioners learn from this 
research? It seems that insurers approach the market for cyber risks in two ways. On the one 
hand, we observed a more traditional insurer approach, where a lot of information is asked to 
                                                
122 With these types of insurance, the relationship between the premium and the pay-out in case of an accident is 
so huge that almost everyone would find it smart to buy such insurance. 
123 The detailed comparison is displayed in Table A1 to A6 in the appendix of this paper. 
124 Avraham, supra note 49. 
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reduce the risk on adverse selection, possibly driven by the fact that insurer contracts are 
drafted by experts on more traditional insurance products. On the other hand, we observed 
some elements that, at least theoretically, could lead to a higher likelihood of a market to 
develop, such as easy access of insurance products and moral hazard measures.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This contribution formulated a theoretical framework to analyze whether current cyber 
insurance contracts contribute to social welfare. We also observed actual cyber insurance 
contracts. Some elements in those contracts foster growth from an insurance law and 
economics perspective, such as the sometimes simple requesting procedure and the arguably 
lower prices for products than several years ago. But we also identified several impediments 
to social welfare surplus, which can be theoretically derived from combining cyber risk 
literature with insurance law and economics, but are present in an unusual mix. Insurers 
currently insufficiently focus their coverage on low impact high likelihood risks, possibly 
driven by a lack of information in the market. We also observed that it is currently hard for 
most SME to make a well-informed choice, although this should be analyzed in future 
empirical research on potential buyers of insurance products. This is either a deliberate 
sustainment of a reverse market for lemons, or the result of the fact that the development of 
the market is in an early stage which results in a variety of different types of coverage in 
combination with recent case law (in the US) that demand a very accurate definition of 
coverage. Also the fact that there are only 2 out of 7 insurers observed that require risk 
reduction measures is an impediment for social welfare growth. Therefore, we believe that 
insurers currently halt between two options. The first option being a strategy of rigorous 
market penetration with easily accessible and attractive insurance products. The second 
option being significant hedging of correlated risks that reduces the potential of cyber 
insurance.   
This research on cyber insurance contracts opens various avenues for future research 
and for improvement in the contribution of cyber insurance to social welfare. This section 
briefly discuses research on the topics of basic cyber insurance policies, mandatory disclosure 
of claim data, requesting procedures, cyber pooling, correlated risks and catastrophic upsides, 
the impact of data breach notification laws and the overlap of cyber insurance with other 
insurance policies. 
As it is difficult to compare the existing policies, it would be interesting to study the 
possibility of a basic cyber insurance policy that covers the most important and/or frequent 
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cyber risks. With such a basic coverage, insurers only have to be compared on price and 
deductibles and not on complicated and widely differing coverage clauses. At the same time, 
the most important and frequent forms of cyber damage would then be covered, which 
reduces the risk of companies who have bought insurance to actually not be insured for such 
risks due to overlooked exclusion clauses. Additional insurance (either for other types of 
risks, types of losses, or higher amounts) could then be added to this basic insurance. Such an 
approach can be beneficial in fighting adverse selection, because firms with lower risks (such 
as the bakery that was included in this research) might only take the basic insurance, whereas 
other firms may decide to buy add-ons. 
In order to tackle the problem of data unavailability, one could consider mandatory 
disclosure of claim data. This would make more data available faster, which could enable 
insurance companies to build better products because they can better estimate the distribution 
of risk of their portfolio. Simultaneously, it could solve issues concerning exaggeration of 
cyber risk as a sales strategy. However, due to the possible disadvantages of the forced nature 
of mandatory disclosure, more research in this direction is needed. 
The requesting procedures for cyber insurance for SMEs are often very time-
consuming and complicated.  We recommend investigating which questions are essential in 
order to create a sufficient risk profile, to enable a simpler requesting procedure. Possibly, the 
market will correct itself in the sense that insurers that do not offer simpler requesting 
procedures will not gain market share.  
It is worth analyzing alternatives for cyber insurance. Common solutions to the issues 
of systemic risks are co-operation between insurance companies on data sharing, re-insurance 
of risks, mandatory insurance, pooling of risks and state intervention.125 Several scholars 
have argued that in particular pooling between companies is a potentially more efficient 
alternative because it eliminates transactions costs and overhead costs of the insurer.126 
Future research could focus on the consumer side of cyber insurance to compare the 
willingness to buy cyber insurance with other possibilities for risk sharing, such as pooling.  
 In order to contribute to the broad stream of literature that studies the systemic 
element of cyber risks, it would be very interesting to research empirically what the degree of 
correlation is between cyber risks. This is closely connected to research that focuses on the 
potential opportunity for governments to compensate a catastrophic cyber risk upside in order 
foster cyber insurance market development.  
                                                
125 Faure & Hartlief, supra note 27. 
126 See the discussion in section III.C of this contribution. 
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From an insurance law and economics perspective, it would be interesting to 
investigate to what extent the implementation of further reaching data breach notification 
laws is likely to drive the European cyber insurance market.127 Furthermore, it is worth 
investigating the overlap of cyber insurance with traditional property insurance. Many SMEs 
have the perception that cyber risks are already covered by traditional insurances.128 
Of course, given the rapidly changing nature of the Internet, the results are a snapshot 
and it is not unlikely that the premiums analyzed in the case study will differ in the future. In 
addition, the Authors requested a limited number of contracts on behalf of a limited number 
of organizations, so that generalizations should be made with care. Furthermore, this case 
study only observed one national market, in order to avoid that differences between policies 
are due to underlying national factors (such as legislation) that may differ between countries. 
However, given that cyber risk is an international phenomenon that does not stop at national 
borders and because the insurers investigated all are international companies, the results 
found for the case study in the Netherlands are likely relevant for other countries as well.  
                                                
127 Proposal 2012/0011 of the European Commission. On January 1 2016, a national data breach notification law 
entered into force in the Netherlands, with fines for non-compliance up to €810.000. 
128 Verbond van Verzekeraars, Dutch Insurance Industry in Figures (2014), 
https://www.verzekeraars.nl/verzekeringsbranche/cijfers/Documents/ 
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 Table 1: Correlated Risks versus Cascade Effects from the Perspective of the Insured 
 Cascade effects (many third parties are hit) ê 
Correlated risk (identical 
risk operationalizes at many 
other insured) ê 
No Yes 
No Perfectly insurable Third party coverage 
important  / caps provide a 
simple mitigation of risk.  
Yes First party coverage is 
imposing the insurer to 
systemic uncertainties. 
Both third party coverage as 




Table 2: Premiums as Percentage of the Insured Amount 
Insurer Small (< 1M Euro) Large (> 1M Euro) 
ACE 0.53% 0.53% - 0.75% 
AIG 0.33% 0.40% - 0.56% 
Allianz No response (but the Authors did receive coverage) 
AON 0.26% 0.32% - 0.36% 
Chubb 0.35% 0.35% - 0.99% 
CNA > 0.50% (incomplete information) 
HDI-Gerling Only coverage for online banking fraud 
Hiscox 0.34% 0.34% - 0.74% 





Table 3: Coverage Clauses and Number of Insurers Providing Coverage 
Coverage Cause of cyber loss Insured Losses 
Covered (out 
of 7 insurers) 
 Third party liability 
Privacy 
liability 
Disclosure of confidential information collected 
or handled by the firm or under its care, custody 
or control 
Legal liability 7 
Vicarious liability 2 





Insertion of computer viruses / unauthorised 
access of the insured causing damage to third's 
systems / disturbance of authorised access by 
clients / misappropriation of intellectual property 
Cost resulting from reinstatement 5 




Breach of software, trademark and media 
exposures (libel, etc.) 
Legal liability 3 
 
First party liability 
Crisis  
management 
All hostile attacks on information and 
technology assets 
Costs to reinstate reputation 7 
Cost for notification of stakeholders  





Denial-of-service attack / hacking Cost resulting from reinstatement 5 
Loss of profit 5 
 
Data asset       
protection 
Change / destruction of information assets and 
other intangible assets 
Cost resulting from reinstatement and  
replacement of data 
7 
Cost resulting from reinstatement and  





Extortion to release, change, damage, destroy or 
transfer information / technology assets 
Cost of extortion payment 5 











Table A1: Coverage of Third Party Liability per Insurer 
NOTE: 'Y' is stated when coverage is provided, 'N' when no coverage is provided, and 'O' when optional coverage is offered. Insurers AIG and 
AON use the same policy for cyber insurance.  
Coverage Cause of cyber loss Insured Losses Comments on the 
interpretation  
# ACE AIG/ 
AON 






or handled by the firm 
or under its care, 
custody or control (e.g. 
due to negligence, 
intentional acts, loss, 
theft by employees) 
Legal liability (also defence 
and claim expenses (fines), 
regulatory defence costs) 
 
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Vicarious liability (when 
control of information is 
outsourced) 
If not mentioned in the 
policy, it is assumed 
that the loss is not 
insured 
2 N N Y N Y N 
Crisis control (e.g. cost of 
notifying stakeholders, 
investigations, forensic and 
public relations expenses) 
Consultants (legal, IT, 
forensic, PR) and 
notification/ 
monitoring costs 





of computer viruses / 
unauthorised access of 
the insured causing 
damage to a third 
party, disturbance of 




Cost resulting from 
reinstatement 
Recovery costs caused 
by insurer's behaviour 
or system/security 
errors 
5 Y N Y Y Y Y 
Cost resulting from legal 
proceeding 
Consultant for legal 
advice 





Breach of software, 
trademark and media 
exposures (libel, etc.) 
Legal liability (also defence 
and claims expenses 
(fines), regulatory defence 
costs) 
 
3 Y O Y Y N N 
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Table A2: Coverage of First Party Liability per Insurer 
 
Coverage Cause of cyber loss Insured Losses Comments on the 
interpretation  
# ACE AIG/ 
AON 




All hostile attacks on 
information and 
technology assets 
Costs from specialised 




7 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cost for notification of 
stakeholders and 
continuous monitoring (e.g. 
credit card usage) 
1. Notification and 2. 
Monitoring services 






Cost resulting from 
reinstatement 
 5 Y O Y Y Y Y 





Information assets are 
changed, corrupted or 
destroyed by a computer 
attack / damage or 
destruction of other 
intangible assets (e.g. 
software applications) 
Cost resulting from 
reinstatement and 
replacement of data 
 7 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cost resulting from 
reinstatement and 
replacement of intellectual 
property (e.g. software) 
 4 Y N Y Y N Y 
Cyber 
extortion 
Extortion to release or 
transfer information or 
technology assets such 
as sensitive data / to 
change, damage or 
destroy information or 
technology assets / to 
disturb or disrupt 
services 
Cost of extortion payment Only the payment  5 Y O Y Y Y Y 





2 N O N Y N Y 
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Coverage Insured Losses ACE Notes AIG/
AON 
Notes CNA Notes 
Privacy 
liability 
Legal liability (also defence 
and claim expenses (fines), 
regulatory defence costs) 
Y 4.1, p15, an 
(administrative) fine is 
excluded ex 6.13 p.16 and 
ex 4 p. 28 
Y Claims: 1.4.1 Defence 
costs and regulatory fines, 
deductable is 10% of fine 
with a of minimum 50k, 
sublimit of 500k (1.3.2) 
Y Liability (2.2) and fines 
(2.6) 
Vicarious liability (when 
control of information is 
outsourced) 
N Not mentioned N Not included, not excluded N Not mentioned 
Crisis control (e.g. cost of 
notifying stakeholders, 
investigations, forensic and 
public relations expenses) 
Y p. 5 (under first party 
liability) 
Y First response (legal 
advice, IT advice, costs 
related to reputation 
management) 




Cost resulting from 
reinstatement 
Y Paragraph 3, p.14 N Not mentioned Y 2.4b 
Cost resulting from legal 
proceeding 







Legal liability (also defence 
and claims expenses 
(fines), regulatory defence 
costs) 
Y Paragraph 4.1, p15 N Excluded explicitly, but 
not for claims or defence 
costs following from loss 
of company data (2.5) 
Y Slander included (2.1) 
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Coverage Insured Losses CNA Notes Chubb Notes Hiscox Notes 
Privacy 
liability 
Legal liability (also defence 
and claim expenses (fines), 
regulatory defence costs) 
Y Liability (2.2) and 
fines (2.6) 
Y p.5: Fines are excluded (2.3 (f) 
(exclusions to clauses 2-6) and the 
definition of clause 1: legal liability loss 
that does not include fines ex p.24 (ii). 
Y p.3: a civil fine 
is included, p.3. 
Vicarious liability (when 
control of information is 
outsourced) 
N Not mentioned Y p.27: A system is interpreted as also 
including licensed systems. 
N Not mentioned 
Crisis control (e.g. cost of 
notifying stakeholders, 
investigations, forensic and 
public relations expenses) 




Cost resulting from 
reinstatement 
Y Paragraph 2.4b Y p.7: Legal liability loss is insured and a 
conduit wrongful act [which is an 
unauthorized access to a third party 
system from the system of the insured (p. 
20)] is not excluded p.7 (2.1) (d) (ii) 
Hence third party damage is covered. 
Y p.3. 
Cost resulting from legal 
proceeding 
Y Cyber theft of money 
and securities 
explicitly is included. 





Legal liability (also defence 
and claims expenses 
(fines), regulatory defence 
costs) 
Y Slander is included 
(Paragraph 2.1). 
N p.8, paragraph 2.2 (f): Content Wrongful 
Act, infringing intellectual property 
(p.20), and Reputational Wrongful Act 
(Slander/Defamation p.26) are excluded. 
N Not mentioned 
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Table A5: Details of Coverage of First Party Liability for ACE, AIG/AON, and Allianz 
 
Coverage Insured Losses ACE Notes AIG/
AON 




Costs from specialised 
service provider to reinstate 
reputation 
Y paragraph 4,p15 Y First response (legal advice, 
IT advice, costs related to 
reputation management) 
Y paragraph 1.9 
Cost for notification of 
stakeholders and 
continuous monitoring (e.g. 
credit card usage) 
Y paragraph 4, p5 Y Including call enter up to 6 
months after reporting 
(1.2.6) and premiums for 
identity fraud insurances up 
to 2 years after reporting 
(1.2.7) 
Y 3.50 (f) (ii) credit 
monitoring services for a 
period of up to six months 
following the date of such 





Cost resulting from 
reinstatement 
Y Not mentioned N Optional Y paragraph 1.6 
Loss of profit Y "cost to avoid loss of profit 
are insured" , p.6. Business 
losses insured p.10, hence Y 





Cost resulting from 
reinstatement and 
replacement of data 
Y paragraph 4.1 p5 Y When caused by insured or 
system failure: reasonable 
and necessary costs (1.2.4) 
Y paragraph 1.7 
Cost resulting from 
reinstatement and 
replacement of intellectual 
property (e.g. software) 
Y paragraph 4.1,p5  N Only reinstatement of third 
person data 
Y paragraph 1.6 
Cyber 
extortion 
Cost of extortion payment Y  N Optional Y paragraph 1.8 
Cost related to avoid 
extortion  
(investigative costs) 
N Only costs directly resulting 
from cyber extortion 
N Optional N Not mentioned 
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Table A6: Details of Coverage of First Party Liability for Chubb, CNA, and Hiscox 
 
 




Costs from specialised 
service provider to reinstate 
reputation 
Y up to 12 months after 
reporting, 1.6 
Y Crisis management expenses 
means (among others) the 
costs of an a public relations 
consultant (p.20) 
Y p.4 
Cost for notification of 
stakeholders and 
continuous monitoring (e.g. 
credit card usage) 
Y Both in case notification is 
prescribed by law and in 
case such rules are absent 
(1.7) 
Y p.20 Among others: "Call 
centre activity and 






Cost resulting from 
reinstatement 
Y paragraph 1.2 Y p.5 Y p.4 





Cost resulting from 
reinstatement and 
replacement of data 
Y paragraph 1.1 Y "reasonable" Recovery 
expenses for E-Business 
interruption are covered (p.5 
clause 3 and p.26) 
Y p.5 
Cost resulting from 
reinstatement and 
replacement of intellectual 
property (e.g. software) 
Y paragraph 1.1 N "reasonable" Recovery 
expenses for E-Business 
interruption are covered (p.5 
clause 3 and p.26); system 





Cost of extortion payment Y paragraph 1.4 Y p.22 Y p.5 
Cost related to avoid 
extortion  
(investigative costs) 
Y paragraph 1.4 N p.22 Y p.5 
